Sprat to Catch Mackerel

It is too optimistic to recognize the consecutive escalation as simple intimidation to Japan. The Minister of Defense, Itsunori Onodera, revealed that a Chinese navy vessel locked radar on Japanese ship of the Maritime Self-defense Force on the East China Sea last month. The radar was normally used for aiming a target for missile attack. The officials of the government of Japan regard that Chinese activity as close to use of force. We need to analyze what exists behind the escalation strategy.

According to the press briefing of Onodera, A Chinese navy vessel, Jianwei II class frigate, radiated fire control radar on a Japanese Maritime Self-defense Force destroyer, Yudachi, through two-mile distance on January 30^th. Newspapers reported the tension of clues inside the destroyer when the ship censored the radar. Onodera also announced another incident in which a Chinese vessel aimed radar on a flying helicopter of Japanese Self-defense Force on January 19^th.

The experts in Japan perceive those actions as possible expressions of adversary. The officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs wonder whether the Chinese government ordered those activities and understood what it meant. Onodera stated that the incident had been extremely unusual and might have invited very dangerous situation. Some officials of the government told the situation between Japan and China entered into a new stage.

The escalation of China has been accelerated. Before mid-December last year, when LDP won the general election determining Shinzo Abe to be the Prime Minister, the ships of China invading Japan’s territory around Senkaku were with coast guards. It was after Abe administration started when Chinese aircrafts and military ships are often going around there. The radar pointing seems to be coincided with the announcement of US Secretary of State that US would oppose any activity which harms Japan’s administration on Senkaku Islands. The escalation must be silent protest against the events in Japan and US.

Considering what is the true intention, we need to think that China is trying to communicate more with US than Japan. China must be frustrated with the hawkish attitude of Abe administration. In terms of military strategy, however, Senkaku Islands don’t matter very much. But what if China can make a deal with US over those small islands? The leaders of China may think that Senkaku can lead to big gain with small risk, or be a sprat to catch a mackerel. If US is less committed to the issue, China can take stronger position against Japan. And if US is deeply involved in the issue, China would make this issue to be a direct deal with US. That’s why China closely watches the response of Japan-US alliance.