Broken Safety Net

The governmental committee for verification of the accident in First Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant released new record of interviews to one hundred twenty-seven people who were involved in the accident at the time. It revealed that Nuclear and Industry Safety Agency, an agency inside Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and abolished after the nuclear accident in Fukushima, had not played appropriate role for preventing severe accident at all.

According to an article of Tokyo Shimbun, Earthquake-proof Safety Judgment Director in NISA, Masaru Kobayashi, revealed reluctance of NISA in dealing with risk of huge earthquake to the interview. Although Kobayashi proposed reviewing risk of as great earthquake as Jogan era in the ninth century in 2010, some officers of NISA threatened Kobayashi, saying “You will be fired, if you are involved in it too much.”

At that time, NISA prioritized national policy for promoting development of mixed oxide fuel from used nuclear fuel to nuclear sefety. Discussion of disaster prevention was thought as having negative impact on the project. Power generation company was accomplice of NISA. Koji Yamagata, Officer for Overseeing Safety Standard of Nuclear Facility, testified that officers of power companies had been reluctant in every opportunity and received various kind of pressure when he tried to review safety guideline.

NHK reported that one of the staffs of Tokyo Electric Power Company told his recognition about meltdown in nuclear reactors to the interview. He realized that level of cooling water in the first reactor of First Fukushima Plant was less than a half and upper part of nuclear fuel exposed to the air must have been melted at the point of one month later from the accident. “I heard a story in the company that ‘meltdown’ should not be used in explaining the situation of reactors, because there was not clear definition of meltdown.” Labeling the public stupid and nervous, the experts of nuclear technology enclose information that is fatal to national interest.

Asahi Shimbun ran an article about the interview on then Governor of Fukushima, Yuhei Sato. Sato remembered that there was no information provided from national government or TEPCO hours after the accident. Closely watching TV, he independently decided to issue evacuation order to the residents around the nuclear power plant.

System for Prediction of Environmental Emergency Dose Information, or SPEEDI, in Nuclear Safety Technology Center did not work speedily. Deputy President of NISA, Eiji Hiraoka, revealed a recognition that no one in the agency talked about, or even had an idea of, taking advantage of the data of SPEEDI for evacuation, even though they knew the existence of such a system. After all, people in the nuclear village just stalled in the severe accident, escaping from their responsibility.